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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEVENTH
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT RANDOM SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTING OF
PARTICIPANTS IN EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. - Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ii9 S. Ct. 68 (1998).
The special needs exception, first articulated in New Jersey v.
TL.O.,1 makes the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment unnecessary "in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,"
make it impracticable. 2 In Vernonia School District 4 7J v. Acton,3 the
Supreme Court, relying on the special needs exception, held that ran-
dom suspicionless drug testing of high school students who partici-
pated in the school's athletic program did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.4 Finding that "special needs" existed in the context of
public schools s the Court engaged in a three-pronged balancing test to
determine the reasonableness of the proposed intrusion,6 weighing the
"nature of the privacy interest,"7 the "character of the intrusion,"' and
the "nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue ...
and the efficacy of th[e] means for meeting it."9 As commentators have
recognized, the special needs balancing test has created an increasingly
larger exception to the Fourth Amendment's protection:10 many courts,
relying on a broad reading of Vernonia, have expanded the application
1 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
2 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
3 515 U.S. 646 (i995).
4 See id. at 664-65. Originally, the only specified hurdle in identifying a special need was
whether the program in question served a need beyond law enforcement. See The Supreme
Court, x996 Term--Leading Cases, iii HARv. L. REV. 289, 294 & n.50 (1997). However, in
Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997), the Court seemingly raised this bar, stating that "the
proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial - important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion." Id. at 1303 (emphasis added). It seems more
likely, however, that rather than altering the standard for special needs, the Court was simply de-
fining a special need as a need that survives the balancing test elucidated in Vernonia. See The
Supreme Court, r996 Term-Leading Cases, supra, at 294-96.
5 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
6 See id. at 652-65.
7 Id. at 654.
8 Id. at 658.
9 Id. at 660.
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth
Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89, 129-31 (1992); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note,
"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Pref-
erence Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 551-52 (1997).
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of the special needs exception in the public school setting." In Janu-
ary 1998, in Todd v. Rush County Schools,'2 the Seventh Circuit fol-
lowed this trend and held that random suspicionless drug testing of
high school students participating in any extracurricular activity did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 13  In light of Supreme Court
precedent dealing with suspicionless drug testing, the Seventh Circuit
incorrectly applied the special needs exception by neglecting to recog-
nize the narrow circumstances that justified the holding in Vernonia.
In 1996, the School Board of Rush County, Indiana, enacted a drug
testing program that prohibited high school students from participat-
ing in any extracurricular activities or driving to and from school 14
unless the students and their parents or guardians consented to ran-
dom urinalysis testing for drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. 15 A positive
test result barred a student from extracurricular activities and driving
to and from school unless she could produce either a valid explanation
or, upon retesting, a negative test result.16
As a consequence of their parents' refusal to consent to drug test-
ing, the plaintiff students were barred from participating in any extra-
curricular activity.17  The plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action against the
Rush County School District claiming a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.' 8 The district court granted the school district's motion
for' summary judgment,1 9 finding the Rush County program suffi-
ciently similar to the program in Vernonia to uphold the Rush County
drug-testing program.
20
11 See, e.g., Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., Nos. 97-5405, 97-5408,
1998 WL 663336, at *4, *12-*25 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998) (upholding the suspicionless drug testing
of school teachers and administrators); Aubrey v. School Bd., 148 F.3 d 559, 561-65 (Sth Cir. 1998)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of public school custodians); Commonwealth v. Cass, 709
A.2d 350, 355-58 (Pa. 1998) (upholding suspicionless canine-assisted student locker searches for
all students). But see, e.g., Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. i v. Lopez, No. 9 7SCI24, 1998 WL 373305, at
*13-*14 (Colo. June 29, 1998) (en banc) (striking down a high school suspicionless drug testing
program designed to test participants in any extracurricular activity); Kennedy v. Dexter Consol.
Sch., 955 P.2d 693, 699-702 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring individualized suspicion to justify
student strip searches); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 255-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (declining
to apply the special needs exception to a student search conducted by a police officer).
12 133 F.3 d 984 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, II9 S. Ct. 68 (1998).
13 See id. at 985-87.
14 Todd did not involve a challenge to the driving element. See id. at 985 n.i.
15 See id. at 984.
16 See id. at 985.
17 See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
18 See id. at 8ol. The plaintiffs also claimed that the program violated the Indiana Constitu-
tion. See id.
19 See id. at 807. Once the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claim, it no longer
had original jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim, and it accordingly dismissed the state
claim without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1990). See id.
20 See id. at 8o6-07.
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed.21  Writing for a unanimous court,
Judge Cummings 22 asserted that Vernonia and Schaill v. Tippecanoe
County School Corp.23 controlled the outcome.24 Initially, he explained
that the testing program "was undertaken in furtherance of the school
districts' 'responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian
and tutor of children entrusted to its care"' as a means of deterring
drug use.25  Judge Cummings then stated that the justifications for
testing athletes in Vernonia were applicable to students in all extracur-
ricular activities in three respects. First, "successful extracurricular ac-
tivities require healthy students. '26 Second, the drug-testing program,
like those in Vernonia and Schaill, was only applicable to those stu-
dents who voluntarily participated in extracurricular activities, which
the court characterized as a privilege.27  Third, like athletes, partici-
pants in extracurricular activities serve as role models for other stu-
dents, and it "is not unreasonable to couple th[is] benefit[] with an ob-
ligation to undergo drug testing."28  Judge Cummings concluded by
emphasizing the need to provide school administrators with a reason-
able means with which they can control the drug problem facing
American schools.
29
The Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en
banc.30  In dissent, Judge Ripple31 argued that extending Vernonia to
apply to all students participating in extracurricular activities ignores
the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler v. Miller.3 2  Judge Ripple
explained that Chandler struck down the testing program because the
targeted group neither had a "high degree of drug use" nor performed
"highly sensitive safety-related tasks" that would justify the testing.
3 3
21 See Todd, X33 F.3d at 987.
22 Judges Manion and Evans joined Judge Cummings's opinion.
23 864 F.2d 1309, 1318-22 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a high school's random suspicionless
drug testing program designed to target athletes and cheerleaders was reasonable).
24 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
25 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 ('995)).
26 Id.
27 See id. The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Willis II v. Anderson Community School
Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998), emphasized this point. See id. at *6
'Mn Vernonia and Todd drug testing could be construed as part of the 'bargain' a student strikes
in exchange for the privilege of participating in favored activities.").
28 Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.3d at 1320) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 See id.
30 See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3 d 571, 571 (7th Cir. 1998).
31 Judge Rovner joined Judge Ripple's dissent. Judge Wood's dissent, which Judge Flaum
joined, did not reach the merits of the case. See id. at 573 (Wood, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). Judge Wood argued that questions regarding Vernonia's holding would most
likely reappear, making it important for the Seventh Circuit to explain how it interpreted Verno-
nia instead of "simply say[ing] 'see Vernonia' and leav[ing] it at that." Id.
32 117 S. CL 1295, 1298 (1997) (refusing to apply the special needs exception to a testing pro-
gram that required certain state office candidates to submit to drug testing); see Todd, 139 F.3d at
571 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
33 Todd, I39 .3d at 572 (Ripple, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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Judge Ripple applied this reasoning to Todd: "[T]here is ... certainly
no showing that the targeted group, all students participating in any
extracurricular activity, presents a particularized need."3
4
The Seventh Circuit failed to address critical distinctions between
the targeted groups in Vernonia and Todd and thus erroneously likened
Rush County's drug testing program to the one in Vernonia. As Judge
Ripple's dissent suggested,35 the court ignored the clear command of
precedent that, when suspicion-based testing will not adequately ad-
dress the problem in a special needs setting, suspicionless testing of
groups is reasonable,36 but only to the extent that there is a recogniz-
able correlation between the targeted group and the problem to be ad-
dressed. Creating a testing program in light of this correlation limits
testing to those groups that are actually suspected of engaging in the
proscribed activity. The Seventh Circuit's failure to consider the lack
of correlation in Rush County allows the school to test any number of
students without a modicum of suspicion of drug use and therefore
provides no limitation for who can be tested.37
The Supreme Court's previous decisions concerning suspicionless
drug testing emphasized that testing should be limited to groups that
correlate with a drug problem.38 First, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n,39 the Court applied the special needs exception in
upholding a suspicionless drug-testing program designed to test rail-
road employees after they were involved in an accident, 40 which cer-
34 Id. Judge Ripple suggested that by ignoring Chandler's holding, the court condoned testing
the entire student body. See id. He pointed to two aspects of the panel's decision that are equally
applicable to the entire student body and not limited to extracurricular activities: the needs for
"healthy students" and drug-free role models. Id. Judge Ripple also argued that the panel erred
in assuming that participation in extracurricular activities is voluntary, implicitly rejecting the
argument that a waiver of privacy rights is part of the bargain in choosing to participate in extra-
curricular activities. See id. at 573.
35 See id. at 572-73.
36 See generally Willis II v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL 569114,
at *4 (7 th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998) (suggesting that Supreme Court precedent "strongly indicate[s] that
the feasibility of a suspicion-based search is a key consideration in determining whether it is rea-
sonable for the government to implement a suspicionless regime").
37 The Seventh Circuit also failed to address other distinctions between Vernonia and Todd
that undermine the court's analogical reasoning. For example, the Court in Vernonia emphasized
that athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy because of their common state of undress.
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 ('995). Students in other extracurricular
activities have no reason to possess this lower expectation of privacy. See Trinidad Sch. Dist. No.
i v. Lopez, No. 97SCI24, 1998 WL 373305, at "ii (Colo. June 29, 1998) (en banc).
38 The Court has recognized two distinct bases of correlation that have justified suspicionless
drug testing of a group: the group is suspected of drug use or the group performs highly sensitive
safety-related tasks that create a unique risk to others if exposed to drugs. Because students do
not engage in such safety-sensitive tasks, see Todd, 139 F 3 d at 572 (Ripple, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc); infra note 42, this comment examines the correlation between the
target groups and suspected drug use.
39 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
40 See id. at 6o9, 619, 633-34.
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tainly created a reasonable suspicion of drug use. Second, in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,41 the Court upheld the suspi-
cionless drug testing of Customs Service agents, but limited its holding
to those agents whose drug use would create a unique danger to oth-
ers.42 Third, in Vernonia, the Court justified the drug testing of high
school athletes by emphasizing that members of the athletic teams
were believed to be the "leaders of the drug culture."43  In all three
cases, there existed a reason to suspect a clear correlation between the
target group and a drug problem. Finally, drawing upon these deci-
sions, the Court in Chandler refused to extend the special needs doc-
trine to allow drug testing of certain state office candidates because
"[i]n contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's certification requirement was not well
designed to identify candidates who violated antidrug laws."44  The
Chandler Court, therefore, found that the lack of a correlation between
the target group and the drug problem warranted striking down the
testing scheme.
45
The Seventh Circuit erred by not finding dispositive the fact that
there was no showing of a correlation between participants in extra-
curricular activities and drug use at Rush County High School.46 The
district court admitted that there was "very little to indicate that stu-
41 489 U.S. 656 (r989).
42 See id. at 678-79. Although there was no notable drug use among Customs Service agents,
the Court found that there was a unique risk involved with their use of drugs because of the
safety-sensitive nature of their duties. See id. at 671 ("Customs employees ... plainly 'discharge
duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can
have disastrous consequences.'"); see also Chandler, I17 S. Ct. at 1304 (explaining that "[h]ardly a
decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique con-
text" in which Customs Service agents were exposed to illegal drugs on a daily basis). Under Von
Raab, the suspicionless drug testing of a group that is not suspected of actual drug use requires
that an extraordinary risk of harm result from a single member's drug use. In Von Raab, agents
who were constantly exposed to drugs were authorized to use deadly force and carry a firearm; an
agent's use of drugs could have had disastrous consequences. Such dramatic risks do not exist in
the public school context.
43 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).
44 Chandler, 117 S. CL at 1303-04.
4S See id. at 1303-05; see also Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp.
759, 765 (S.D. Tex. 1989) ("While the discouragement of the use of drugs and alcohol by young
people is honorable, if the means of the discouragement are not narrowly tailored to that goal,
then they are not reasonable in the constitutional sense."); Nathan A. Brown, Recent Develop-
ments, Reining in the National Drug Testing Epidemic: Chandler v. Miller, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 253, 272 (1998) ("[T]he category of permissible searches absent individualized suspicion must
remain narrowly tailored to legitimate governmental interests.").
46 The Seventh Circuit did suggest that participants in extracurricular activities serve as role
models for other students, see Todd, r33 F.3d at 986, which arguably could provide a justification
to test them as a group in order to deter drug use. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected this justification as a motivation for special needs. See Chandler, 117 S. Ct at 1305 ("In-
deed, if a need of the 'set a good example' genre were sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amend-
ment objection, then the care this Court took to explain why the needs in Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia ranked as 'special' wasted many words .... ").
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dents in extracurricular activities were 'ringleaders' of a drug rebel-
lion, as in Vernonia,''47 and the only substance-related injury linked to
extracurricular activities occurred during a single athletic event in the
197OS. 45  The court's failure to consider the lack of correlation in its
decision completely removes the element of suspicion from the deter-
mination of who should be subjected to testing,49 and as a result, fu-
ture application of its rationale would warrant testing every student.
50
The Supreme Court did not. intend to sanction such a broad and inva-
sive search in Vernonia.5 x Furthermore, such a broadly applied intru-
sion of privacy is exactly what the Court sought to avoid in Skinner,
Von Raab, and Chandler when it emphasized the need to tailor the
testing program narrowly.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Todd ignored the Court's correla-
tion limitation expressed in similar cases. As a result, the court sanc-
tioned a broad intrusion of students' privacy interest without any
modicum of suspicion, which only serves to erode further the impor-
tance of suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
5 2
47 Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 8o5 (S.D. Ind. 1997). The district court
claimed that these facts were insignificant because "when the government acts as guardian and
tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor
might undertake." See id. at 8o6 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the district court's argument relies on the unreasonable assumption that rea-
sonable guardians suspect their wards of drug use and consequently would subject them to drug
testing despite the fact that there is no showing that they actually are at risk of using drugs.
48 See id. at 803.
49 It could be argued that the determination of exactly which cases present a sufficient correla-
tion between drug use and the targeted group to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny presents
judges with a question of degree that has no clear answer. However, the inability to draw clear
lines for judges to determine the outcomes of specific cases is inherent in the nature of the bal-
ancing test used in applying the special needs doctrine. See supra sources cited in note io. Fur-
thermore, even if relying upon a correlation between drug use and the targeted group creates a
spectrum of instances in which the special needs doctrine should be applied, it is clear that Todd
falls at the no correlation end of the spectrum.
50 In fact, the larger the group that a school seeks to target is, the more likely it is that the pro-
gram will be upheld because it will be less likely that individualized suspicion will be able to ad-
dress the problem. See Willis II v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., No. 98-1227, 1998 WL
569114, at *7 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998) (comparing the efficacy of individualized suspicion to iden-
tify drug users in any extracurricular activity with identifying drug users among those suspended
from school and concluding that individualized suspicion is less effective for the former because it
is the larger, less observed group).
51 See Vernonia, PS U.S. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's opinion ... re-
serv[es] the question whether the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitution-
ally could impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team
sports, but on all students required to attend school.'); see also Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Random testing of athletes does not necessarily imply
random testing of band members or the chess team.").
52 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 684-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the breadth and
imprecision of blanket student searches is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment protections); Buf-
faloe, supra note io, at 557 ("[B]oth the historical record and the overwhelming body of case law
interpreting the requirements of the Fourth Amendment illustrate that individual suspicion has
always been an essential element of a search judged to be reasonable.").
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE - EXPERT TESTIMONY - FIFTH
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT CLINICAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY ON
CAUSATION MUST PASS THE DAUBERT TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF
HARD SCIENCE. - Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., i51 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1998) (en banc).
In the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,'
the Supreme Court held that expert scientific testimony is admissible
only if it is both relevant and reliable.2 Although the Court listed fac-
tors for determining the admissibility of such testimony,3 lower courts
have struggled to implement the Daubert test in specific cases. 4" In
Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc.,s the Fifth Circuit entered this eviden-
tiary fray by applying Daubert to a clinical physician's testimony on
medical causation. 6 The Fifth Circuit's decision to apply Daubert was
correct, but the court erred in its manner of applying that ruling to the
testimony at issue. The court made the unreasoned assumption that
Moore fit the modern paradigm of a case of toxic tort, a paradigm in
which expert opinions on causation have a special need for strong sci-
entific support. Consequently, the court was content to examine each
of the testimony's evidentiary bases merely for its individual suffi-
ciency under Daubert. The court never addressed a crucial comple-
mentary issue: whether the evidentiary bases collectively sufficed to es-
tablish the reliability of the expert's opinion.
On April 23, 199o, Bob T. Moore, a truck driver for Consolidated
Freightways, Inc. (Consolidated), was instructed by supervising per-
sonnel of Consolidated's customer, Ashland Chemical Inc. (Ashland),
to clean up a spill of a toxic toluene solution in his trailer.7 About an
1 509 U.S. 579 (i993).
2 See id. at 589.
3 The five factors are: (i) whether the methodology upon which the testimony is based has
been, or can be, tested; (2) whether the methodology "has been subjected to peer review and pub-
lication"; (3) the methodology's "known or potential rate of error"; (4) the availability and use of
standards to control the methodology's operation; and (5) the extent to which the methodology is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-95.
4 See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5 (4 th ed. 1996 &
Supp. 1998) (noting variations in the lower courts' approaches to admissibility). The lower courts
have significantly differed on how to apply Daubert to expert testimony on medical causation.
See, e.g., Schudel v. General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 99I, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding such expert tes-
timony inadmissible when it relied on studies involving different substances and exposure levels),
cert. denied, i18 S. Ct. 156o (I998), cert. denied sub nom. Hopkins v. General Elec. Co., i18 S. Ct.
156r (x998), and cert. denied sub nom. Carlson v. General Elec. Co., 1i8 S. Ct. i56i (i998);
McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1o38, 1o44 (2d Cir. i995) (holding that questions about cre-
dentials, scientific procedure, and support in the literature relate to probative weight, not admis-
sibility).
5 i51 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
6 See id. at 274.
7 See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 693 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd on reh'g en banc,
i5r F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998). Ashland's plant manager had obtained a copy of the manufacturer's
material safety data sheet, which stated that fumes from the solution could cause injury to a vari-
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hour after completing the cleanup, Moore began experiencing dizzi-
ness, watery eyes, and difficulty breathing. 8 Consolidated's company
doctor treated Moore with oxygen and inhalants. 9 Subsequent treat-
ment did not end Moore's ills, and within months he left his job. '0
During the summer of 19go, Moore met three times with Dr. Daniel
E. Jenkins, a board-certified pulmonary specialist with four decades of
clinical experience. 1 ' Dr. Jenkins diagnosed Moore as having reactive
airways dysfunction syndrome (RADS), an asthma-like condition.12 A
second pulmonary specialist, Dr. Alvarez, confirmed Dr. Jenkins's di-
agnosis and treated Moore for RADS.
13
Moore and his wife filed suit against Ashland in state court, alleg-
ing, in part, that Ashland negligently caused his illness by requiring his
exposure to toxic fumes. 14 Invoking diversity jurisdiction, the defen-
dants removed the case to the District Court for the Southern District
of Texas.' 5
In pretrial proceedings, Moore offered Dr. Jenkins as an expert
witness on two issues: first, that Moore suffered from RADS and, sec-
ond, that exposure to the toluene solution caused Moore's RADS.'
6
The district court disallowed Dr. Jenkins's proposed testimony on cau-
sation, 17 and a jury determined that the defendants' negligence had
not proximately caused Moore's illness.' 8  The Moores appealed,
claiming that the district court had erred in excluding Dr. Jenkins's
testimony. 9 After an en barc hearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
2 0
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Davis 21 stated that Daubert
set the standard for the district court's decision to exclude Dr.
ety of organs, including the lungs. See id. at 693 n.3. Nevertheless, he refused Moore's request to
use a respirator and neglected to measure the level of contamination in the trailer. See id. at 693.
8 See id. at 693.
9 See id. at 702.
1o See Moore, i5 F.3d at 272.
11 See Moore, 126 F.3d at 693-94.
12 See Moore, 151 F. 3d at 272.
13 See Moore, 126 F.3 d at 693-94.
14 See Moore, isi F.3 d at 272.
15 See Moore, 126 F.3d at 683.
16 See id. at 694-95.
17 See id. at 683. The court admitted the causation testimony of Dr. Alvarez, even though it
was "essentially identical" to that of Dr. Jenkins. Moore, i5i F.3 d at 274.
18 See Moore, 126 F.3 d at 683.
'9 See id.
20 See Moore, ii F.3d at 271. The Fifth Circuit had voted sua sponte to rehear the case en
banc, see Moore, 126 F.3 d at 7 16, after a divided panel had reversed, see id. at 709-10.
21 Judges Jolly, Higginbotham, Jones, Smith, Duhe, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, and DeMoss
joined Judge Davis's opinion. See Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., No. 95-20492, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18883, at *2-*3 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998). Judge King concurred in the result only, but did
not write an opinion. See Moore, 15i F.3 d at 279.
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Jenkins's testimony,22 and that General Electric Co. v. Joiner23 set the
standard for review of that decision on appeal.24 Hence, the Fifth Cir-
cuit needed to determine whether the district court had abused its dis-
cretion in deciding that Dr. Jenkins's testimony did not meet Daubert's
dual requirement of relevance and reliability
2 5
According to the court of appeals, Dr. Jenkins's testimony failed to
meet that standard.2 6 The court found that because Dr. Jenkins had
never before treated a patient who had contracted RADS from expo-
sure to toluene, Dr. Jenkins's personal training and experience only in-
directly supported his testimony.27 The court further determined that
given the absence of a systematic study suggesting a connection be-
tween RADS and toluene, Dr. Jenkins's testimony lacked a solid foun-
dation in the medical literature.2 8  Finally, the court concluded that
without other reliable evidence of causation, temporal proximity could
not provide a reliable basis for Dr. Jenkins's opinion.
2 9
Judge Benavides wrote a one-paragraph concurrence, emphasizing
that because the issue was close, the result lay within the trial court's
discretion.30
Judge Dennis dissented.31 He argued that under Daubert the key
question is whether the proffered testimony is "soundly grounded in
the methodology of the expert's discipline."32  The district court had
therefore erred in excluding the testimony of a physician who had ar-
rived at his opinion through well-established medical techniques
even though those techniques did not meet the rigorous expectations of
hard science.
33
22 See Moore, i5i F.3d at 2 74-76.
23 II8 S. CL 512 (i997).
24 See Moore, is F.3d at 274 (explaining that General Elec. Co. held that a trial court's deci-
sion on the admissibility of expert testimony is reversible only for abuse of discretion).
25 See id. at 2 74-75.
26 See id. at 277-79.
27 See id. at 277-78.
28 See id. According to the court, the manufacturer's material safety data sheet did not suffice
because Dr. Jenkins knew neither the specific tests performed by the manufacturer nor the spe-
cific levels of exposure to which the data sheet's findings applied. See id. at 278.
29 See id. at 278.
30 See id. at 279 (Benavides, J., concurring).
31 Judges Parker and Stewart joined Judge Dennis's opinion.
32 Moore, i5i F.3d at 283 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis believed that such a flexible
standard would ensure fidelity to the liberal intent of both Daubert, see id. at 285, and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see id. at 290. Judge Dennis noted that the majority's stringent standards
would make it very difficult for single plaintiffs to obtain admissible expert opinions. See id. at
281, 286. Particularly troublesome for Judge Dennis were the majority's denigration of the sig-
nificance of temporal proximity, see id. at 286, and its insistence on precise knowledge of the level
of exposure, see id. at 287-88.
33 See id. at 280. In the context of medical causation, "hard science" generally involves epi-
demiological studies or laboratory experimentation. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1993).
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The Fifth Circuit correctly decided to apply Daubert to the expert
testimony of a clinical physician. 34 Nevertheless, by reviewing the
bases for Dr. Jenkins's opinion merely individually - without dis-
cussing their collective significance - the court created a misleading
impression of how to implement the Daubert test. The court summa-
rily assumed that the case fit the paradigm of the generic "toxic tort"
35
- a class of cases typically characterized by weak arguments for cau-
sation, which can be rendered reliable by only the most rigorous sci-
ence.36 Under this paradigm, the Fifth Circuit might have been fully
justified in approaching the admissibility issue as it did - by sequen-
tially examining, and rejecting, the separate bases for Dr. Jenkins's
opinion.
37
The Fifth Circuit's approach was flawed, however, in that the
court never justified its adoption of the toxic tort paradigm. Without
such justification, the court's sequential analysis failed to explain why
the evidentiary bases were "collectively inadequate."3  The court
demonstrated that each basis was itself insufficient to establish reli-
ability. However, as the court acknowledged, these bases were not
completely valueless. 39  Therefore, it was still conceivable that, like
experts in other fields, a medical expert could construct reliable testi-
34 There may already be judicial consensus that trial judges must screen all expert testimony
for reliability. See 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1244-45 (7th ed. 1998). However, some commentators
oppose applying Daubert so broadly. See GRAHAM (Supp. i998), supra note 4, § 702.5 (arguing
that Daubert gatekeeping should apply only to hard science); 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266, at 289-93 (1997) (arguing
that trial judges should address reliability issues only when juries cannot reasonably be expected
to resolve them). In reviewing Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3 d 1433 (ith Cir. 1997),
cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998), the Supreme Court
will clarify whether Daubert extends to the testimony of an expert on tire failure, see Carmichael,
131 F.3 d at 1434 - thereby determining whether Daubert covers experts even further removed
from hard science than clinical physicians.
35 Judge Davis's opinion for the court began, "In this toxic tort case .... Moore, 151 F.3 d at
271.
36 The paradigmatic toxic tort involves diffusion and breadth, either through the existence of a
large number of essentially generic victims or through the fact of long periods of exposure or la-
tent illness. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS
IN THE COURTS 3-12 (1987). The judicial decisions most important to the current treatment of
scientific expert testimony fit within this paradigm. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, i8 S. Ct.
512, 5,5-I6 (,997) (involving the development of cancer several years after alleged exposure to
hazardous chemicals); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (involving a prescription drug that was adminis-
tered to millions). The resulting evidentiary criteria might ill suit other kinds of cases. See Joseph
Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387,
1434 (1994).
37 See Moore, 151 F.3d at 2 78-79.
38 Id. at 277.
39 According to the court, the material safety data sheet had "limited value," and temporal
proximity carried "little weight." Id. at 278.
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mony from the individually inadequate - but not meaningless -
bases with which Dr. Jenkins worked.4 0
Having assumed that the toxic tort paradigm applied, the Fifth
Circuit neglected to discuss this possibility.41 Without strong support
from at least one of the Daubert factors, Dr. Jenkins's opinion, which
relied primarily upon a gestalt view of the evidence, lacked the rigor
needed to untangle the complicated causal chain that the paradigm
presupposed. 42 Given the Fifth Circuit's background assumptions, Dr.
Jenkins's testimony could not be considered reliable.
Judge Dennis's dissent shows the consequences of a different van-
tage. For Judge Dennis, the proper paradigm was the classic "single
plaintiff negligence action[]" 43 - the "slip and fall,"44 in which a fail-
ure of care essentially coincides with straightforward physiological
harm.45 In such a simple case, temporal proximity could establish
40 In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Supreme Court observed that "[tihe
sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts." Id. at i8o.
Indeed, scientists routinely use individually unimportant pieces of data to reach reliable results.
Cf. Anthony Z. Roisman, The Courts, Daubert, and Environmental Torts: Gatekeepers or Audi-
tors?, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 565 (1997) (asserting that courts subvert scientific methodol-
ogy by testing data piecemeal). For example, a biologist can use individual - and separately in-
significant - DNA matches to develop a reliable opinion about the relation of two genetic
samples. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 4
(1992). The methodology for deriving a conclusion from the sort of non-quantitative data that Dr.
Jenkins possessed could not be as well-defined as that for comparison of strands of DNA. How-
ever, exclusion based solely upon this difference might conflict with Daubert's implicit recognition
that the contours of science are indeterminate and context-dependent. See Bert Black, The Su-
preme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the Certainty Demon?, 15 CARnozo L.
REV. 2129, 2137 (1994).
41 The court came closest to such a discussion when it acknowledged that, under certain cir-
cumstances, temporal proximity can carry significant evidentiary weight. See Moore, 151 F.3d at
278 (quoting Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995), afd in part, ioo F.3d 1150
(4 th Cir. 1996)). The court did not explain, however, why Moore did not involve such circum-
stances.
42 Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber describe the kind of Bayesian analysis that may have lain
behind the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING
SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 115-30 (1997). By classifying
Moore as a case of toxic tort, the Fifth Circuit created an implicit presumption that the allegation
of causation possessed only a low background probability of being true. Under Bayesian analysis,
such a presumption almost inevitably dooms testimony such as Dr. Jenkins's because even ex-
tremely precise scientific procedures lack reliability in testing for unlikely events. See id. at 119.
Conversely, when an event has a high background probability, even crude tests are likely to lead
to correct results. See id. at 117.
43 Moore, 151 F.3d at 28o (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis's opinion for the panel began,
"In this negligence case .... " Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3 d 679, 682 (sth Cir. 1997),
rev'd on reh'g en banc, 15i F.3d 269 (Sth Cir. 1998).
44 Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication to
Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed Experts, x5 CARDozo L.
REv. 2255, 2256 (1994) (noting that in the traditional negligence case a physician's testimony on
causation was generally allowed).
45 Judge Dennis's panel opinion questioned reliance upon cases involving claims of "surrepti-
tious causation of insidious diseases," as opposed to "episodic traumatic injuries and disorders."
Moore, 126 F.3d at 707-08.
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Moore's exposure as one of the primary potential causes of his illness.46
By ruling out other primary potential causes, Dr. Jenkins's diagnostic
techniques could furnish a substantial, reliable basis for an expert
opinion.
4 7
Hence, the analyses of the majority and the dissent followed not as
much from the intrinsic quality of Dr. Jenkins's evidentiary bases, as
from each side's perception of the essential nature of the case. Each
side should have articulated and justified its background assumptions,
rather than simply asserting derivative conclusions. The Fifth Circuit
might still have found that. it could defend treating Moore like the
paradigmatic toxic tort.48 However, by explicitly defending its choice
of paradigm, the court would at least have correctly signaled that in
determining admissibility, a trial court must consider the overall na-
ture of the case - as well as the individual strengths of an expert's
evidentiary bases.
As Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc. illustrates, fully developed
standards for admitting expert testimony are not likely to emerge
soon.49 Indeed, the current state of perplexity reflects a large and per-
haps intractable problem of modern jurisprudence: the struggle be-
tween the paradigm of the mass toxic tort and that of the isolated in-
dividual accident. Judges should not seek to end such perplexity
through reliance on disputable, yet unexplained, assumptions. In their
desire to chart a course of collective progress, 0 judges should take
heed that individual voyagers still sail in progress's wake.
46 Under Bayesian analysis, recogrition of Moore's exposure as a primary potential cause
would properly lead a court to perceive Dr. Jenkins's expert testimony as more reliable than if the
background probability of causation was less substantial. See supra note 42.
47 The majority neglected to explain why differential etiology, which Moore's physicians used
in running a battery of tests to rule out alternative causes, see Moore, 126 F3d at 694, 696-97,
failed to provide at least a partial scientific basis for Dr. Jenkins's opinion. See Moore, I51 F.3 d
at 277-78. The majority's omission contrasts with the treatment of differential etiology in Amnbro-
sini v. Labarraque, IOI F.3 d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996), in which the District of Columbia Circuit found
that to establish an adequate basis for causation testimony, a physician need not eliminate all al-
ternative causes, see id. at 140.
48 Moreover, it might have found that even if the proper paradigm was the "slip and fall," the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Jenkins's testimony.
49 See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 15 1-52 (1997) (anticipating a gradual
adaptation of Anglo-American adjudication to modern science). Proposed revisions to the Federal
Rules of Evidence would make clear that Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony, but
would not give detailed instructions on the factors for determining admissibility. See
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 119-29 (1998).
50 Consider Justice Breyer's indication that judges should use Daubert to protect beneficial
substances - and their providers - from "the powerful engine of tort liability." General Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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TITLE VII - STANDING - FOURTH CIRCUIT DENIES STANDING TO
WHITE MEN ADVANCING CLAIM OF HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST COWORKERS. - Childress v. City of Rich-
mond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows any "person claim-
ing to be aggrieved" by an "unlawful employment practice" to file
charges against the employer.' Because the Civil Rights Act is chiefly
enforced through the actions of private citizens,2 courts have typically
construed the phrase "person claiming to be aggrieved" broadly in or-
der to confer standing to the fullest extent available under Article III
of the Constitution. 3 In January 1998, a split developed among the
Courts of Appeals on the exact reach of the statute when the Fourth
Circuit divided evenly en banc in Childress v. City of Richmond.4
This division, which produced a per curiam opinion with no analysis,s
affirmed a lower court's decision to deny Title VII standing to white
male plaintiffs who alleged that their superior's disparaging comments
toward blacks and women created a hostile working environment that
impeded the plaintiffs' ability to cooperate with their coworkers and
perform their jobs effectively.6 In their opinions, both Judge Luttig,
writing in concurrence with the Fourth Circuit, and Judge Williams of
the district court evaded the substance of the plaintiffs' complaints,
choosing to reinterpret the claims to fit more neatly into preconceived
notions of gender and race relations. In so doing, both judges demon-
strated a disregard for the value of a nondiscriminatory workplace.
In 1995, seven white male and two white female police officers
filed suit against the City of Richmond and its Chief of Police. They
1 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5 (i994). Title VII defines an "unlawful employment practice" as em-
ployer discrimination "against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Id. § 2oooe-2(a)(z). Title VII also forbids retaliation against employees
who oppose unlawful practices or assist with investigations into unlawful practices. See id.
§ 2oooe-3.
2 See N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding Male Stand-
ing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination Against Females, 64
WASH. L. REv. 365,366, 371-73 (1989).
3 See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 198o) (white woman su-
ing for discrimination against blacks); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176-77 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (current black employees suing for discrimination in hiring against blacks); Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. i971) (former employee suing as an "employee" within
the meaning of Title VII).
4 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
s See id. at 1207-08.
6 See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 938-42 (E.D. Va. 995). Other circuits
considering this issue have extended standing to nonminority plaintiffs. See Clayton v. White
Hall Sch. Dist, 875 F.2d 676, 679-8o (8th Cir. 1989); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50
(7th Cir. 1982); Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 481-83; EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452-54
(6th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466,469-70 (9th Cir. 1976).
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alleged that the racist and sexist remarks made by their white male
supervisor, Lt. Arthur T. Carroll, created a hostile working environ-
ment in violation of Title qII. 7 The plaintiffs also claimed that after
submitting a formal complaint questioning Lt. Carroll's "mental sta-
bility" they were subjected to "adverse treatment," constituting the ad-
ditional Title VII violation of retaliation."
Judge Williams, Senior District Judge, disallowed the plaintiffs'
claims, 9 asserting that to establish discrimination under Title VII a
plaintiff must demonstrate "membership in a protected class."'10 He
drew parallels to cases refusing to recognize claims for same-sex sexual
harassment 1 to support the proposition that a member of one group
cannot have "protected class" status with respect to another member of
the same group. 12 Accordingly, he dismissed the white males' claims
of gender discrimination, arid all of the plaintiffs' claims of racism. 13
He also dismissed the males' claims of retaliation on the ground that a
successful retaliation claim can only be made if the underlying dis-
crimination claim is, if not ultimately meritorious, at least "reasonable"
- a threshold that these complaints did not reach.14
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the phrase "person ag-
grieved" in Title VII is sufficient to confer standing on white males
who have suffered as a result of a hostile environment created by their
supervisor's biases against others.'5  The court relied on the Supreme
7 See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 6, Childress v. City of Richmond, 12o F.3 d 476
(4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1585). The officers also alleged violations of § ig8i and § 1983 and the
public policy of Virginia; the district court disposed of these claims in largely the same manner as
the Title VII claims. See Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 940-42. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's treatment of these claims. See Childress, 134 F.3 d at 1207-08.
8 Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 938.
9 See id. at 940. Judge Williams used language relevant both to the question of standing and
to the question whether Title VII permits a cause of action such as that advanced by the plain-
tiffs, but did not clearly distinguish these two concepts. See id. at 939-40. The Fourth Circuit
similarly blurred the line between "standing" and "cause of action." See Childress, 134 F.3 d at
1209 (Luttig, J., concurring); Childress, 120 F.3 d at 478-81. There is, however, no reason to be-
lieve that a separation of these questions would have resulted in a different analysis.
10 Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(r973)).
11 See id. (citing Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 5995)). At this time,
the Supreme Court had yet to decide Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 18 S. Ct. 998
(1998), which interpreted Title VH to encompass claims by plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual
harassment, see id. at 1003.
12 Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939.
13 See id. at 939-40.
14 See id. Judge Williams reconsidered these issues in 1996 after the male plaintiffs amended
their complaints to allege that they were retaliated against not only for their own charges, but also
for assisting the female officers' charges. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 919 F. Supp. 216,
217 (E.D. Va. 1996). Judge Williams dismissed the new retaliation claims for procedural reasons,
and then reiterated his rationale for dismissing the plaintiffs' original retaliation claims. See id. at
218-19.
15 Childress v. City of Richmond, 12o F.3d 476, 481 (4 th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc, 134 F.3d
1205 (4 th Cir. 1998).
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Court's holding in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 16 in
which, on the rationale that whites were deprived of the "benefits from
interracial associations" when forced to live in segregated housing,
standing had been extended to white plaintiffs suing under Title VIII
to combat housing discrimination against blacks. 17 The Childress
court highlighted the similarities in language between Title VII and Ti-
tle VIII, and noted that all other circuits to consider the issue had
granted Title VII standing to nonminority plaintiffs.',
The court's judgment was vacated later that year' 9 and the case
reheard en banc.20 The en banc panel split evenly on the Title VII
claims, thus reinstating the district court's ruling without additional
comment in a per curiam opinion. 21 Judge Luttig wrote a separate
concurrence to affirm his agreement with the district court 22 on the
ground that Trafficante was not controlling precedent. 23 Judge Luttig
noted that Title VIII, and not Title VII, provided a broad definition of
the term "aggrieved person"; he interpreted the undefined use of the
phrase "person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII to evince a con-
gressional intent to import "prudential standing limitations" into the
statute, rather than an intent to extend standing to the fullest extent
allowable under the Constitution. 24 As such limitations include bars
on third-party standing, Judge Luttig concluded that the claims of the
white male plaintiffs must fail.25
In their opinions, both Judge Luttig and Judge Williams addressed
claims not actually advanced by the plaintiffs in order to deny them
standing. Judge Luttig described the plaintiffs as "alleging] that their
white male superiors made disparaging comments about black and
female co-workers, thus subjecting these co-workers to a hostile work
environment. '26 This statement is irreconcilable with the plaintiffs'
brief, which alleged an environment hostile to all of the police officers,
16 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
17 Id. at 210.
18 See Childress, 12o F.3d at 481. The Fourth Circuit also reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the male officers' new retaliation claims. See id. at 483.
19 See id. at 476.
20 Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 998) (per curiam) (en banc), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
21 See id. at 1207.
22 See id. at 1208 (Luttig, J., concurring). Judge Luttig's opinion was joined by Judges
Wilkins and Williams.
23 See id. at 1209-10.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 1209. In addition, Judge Luttig argued that the different legislative histories of
Title VII and Title VIII demonstrate that different meanings were intended for those sections.
See id. at 121o n.3. He pointed out that harm to members of the majority forced to live in segre-
gated housing had been mentioned during the subcommittee hearings on Title VIII as one of the
evils the statute was designed to prevent, yet no similar history could be found to justify such an
interpretation of Title VII. See id.
26 Id. at 1208 (emphasis added).
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including the plaintiffs themselves.2 7  Yet Judge Luttig barely ac-
knowledged this aspect of the plaintiffs' claims, 28 writing instead that
the plaintiffs had complained of a work environment hostile "for
blacks and women."29  With this new interpretation of the plaintiffs'
asserted injuries in hand, Judge Luttig had no trouble reaching the
conclusion that Title VII's breadth is not commensurate with Article
11130 and therefore does not encompass "third-party" claims. 31
Though, filtered through Judge Luttig's lens, these claims surely were
"third-party," this was not the plaintiffs' argument; rather, the plain-
tiffs claimed a violation of their own rights to be free of a discrimina-
tory environment.32 Authority for the validity of such a claim can be
found in the Trafficante opinion's failure even to address the possibility
that the claims of nonminority plaintiffs could be termed "third-party."
Judge Williams also argued that the officers were "attempting to
recover for violations of other people's civil rights,"33 but unlike Judge
Luttig, did not perceive the plaintiffs to be complaining of a work en-
vironment hostile to blacks and women. Rather, he conducted his
analysis as though the officers were alleging discrimination against
themselves in the form of "better treatment."34  He concluded that a
white male cannot discriminate against another white male on the the-
ory that to be eligible for Title VII protection, a member of a group
must be protected relative to someone else, namely, the person accused
of acting in a discriminatory fashion.35  The Supreme Court rejected
this "relational" interpretation of Title VII in the same-sex sexual har-
27 See Brief of Appellants at 17, Childress v. City of Richmond, 12o F.3d 476 (4 th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-i585) ("[Tlhis bias supposedly in the plaintiffs' favor actually created a hostile working
environment in which the police officers were divided by gender and race.").
28 See Childress, 134 F.3 d at 12o8 (Luttig, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe plaintiffs ... allege that...
[they] have suffered ... the breakdown of esprit de corps that results from working in a racially or
sexually polarized environment.").
29 Id.
30 Judge Luttig's argument seems out of step with Supreme Court jurisprudence, as the Court
relied on just such a broad interpretation of Title VII to support its interpretation of Title VIII in
Trafficante. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (quoting Hack-
ett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)).
31 Judge Luttig also argued that Title VIII should be interpreted to confer broader standing
than Title VII because Title VIII is enforced completely by private suits, whereas Title VII is en-
forced partially by suits brought by the EEOC. See Childress, 134 F.3d at 121o n.3 (Luttig, J.,
concurring). However, originally neither Title VIII nor Title VII allowed for agency enforcement,
and thus there could have been no difference in congressional intent on this point. See Waters v.
Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976). Further, it is unlikely that Congress intended
to limit standing when it increased Title VI's protections by amending the statute to allow the
EEOC to bring suit. See id.
32 See Brief of Appellants at 13, 17-18, Childress, 12o F.3d 4 76 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1585).
33 Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Va. i995).
34 Id. at 940 (emphasis removed) ("At its heart, the officers' Title VII claim either attempts to
assert the civil rights of others or alleges that they were discriminated against by being provided
... better treatment than their black peers.").
35 See id. at 939.
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assment case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 36 decided only
two months after the Fourth Circuit's holding in Childress. Judge
Williams's insistence that a white male cannot be in a protected class
with respect to another white male is plainly inconsistent with Oncale.
That the claim presented in Oncale hardly seems comparable to the
situation in Childress only underscores Judge Williams's flawed rea-
soning, that is, his use of modes of analysis intended for more tradi-
tional Title VII cases.37 Even in assessing the claims of retaliation,
Judge Williams wrote that "the record does not show that the white
male plaintiffs suffered discrimination for their gender or race, nor
does it show that the white males' EEOC charge to that effect was the
motivation for retaliation."38 However, the plaintiffs were not claim-
ing they themselves were discriminated against; rather, they were
claiming that discrimination against their coworkers resulted in inju-
ries to themselves by disrupting the relationships necessary for police
officers to function.3 9 By devoting the bulk of his argument to a claim
the plaintiffs had not made, Judge Williams left the central question
unanswered: Does Title VII authorize a remedy for injuries inflicted
on a plaintiff as a result of illegal discrimination against another
party?
Some insight into both judges' reasoning may be found in portions
of their opinions suggesting that their approach to Title VII standing
was less a product of statutory interpretation than an unacknowledged
consideration of the merits of the officers' claims.40  Although Judge
Luttig wrote that the officers had complained of a breakdown in "es-
prit de corps,"41 he refused to interpret the plaintiffs' claims as alleging
the presence of an environment hostile to themselves - implying that
he did not sense the existence of such an environment. Similar threads
are present in the district court's opinions: the plaintiffs alleged that
their supervisor's actions created intolerable tensions in the workplace,
but the district court repeatedly characterized Lt. Carroll's remarks -
36 118 S. Ct. 998 (igg8). Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "it would
be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not dis-
criminate against other members of that group." Id. at iooi (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 499 (X977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 For instance, the court used the "protected class" test articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), see Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939, even though this test was
created to establish criteria for a prima facie case of discrimination in which the motivation for
the employer's actions was in dispute, see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796-97, 802. In Chil-
dress, however, the supervisor's biases were not in dispute, which should have indicated that the
McDonnell Douglas test would be of limited use.
38 Childress v. City of Richmond, 99 F. Supp. 216, 220 (E.D. Va. 1996) (emphasis added).
39 See Brief of Appellants at 13, 17-18, Childress v. City of Richmond, 12o F.3 d 476 (4 th Cir.
1997) (No. 96-1585).
40 For a discussion of how judges often use standing to disguise a decision on the merits, see
Mark V. Mishnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663,
663-64 (i977).
41 Childress, 134 F.3d at 1208 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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lantes" and his "pussy posse '4 2 - as somehow conferring a benefit on
the male officers. The court asserted that the officers complained of
"favoritism in [their] favor"43 and portrayed their claimed interest not
as a right to a discrimination-free workplace, but as one "to be free of
tensions caused by special treatment.
'44
This repeated recasting of the substance of the officers' claims re-
veals the unwillingness of Judges Luttig and Williams to perceive any
injury to the officers, thus leading them to cloak their decisions on the
merits in the rhetoric of standing. Both judges apparently conceive of
race and gender relations as a zero-sum game in which a loss to one is
a gain to another, in direct contrast to other courts, which have held
that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act are meant to enforce the
rights of all employees to benefit from "advantageous personal, profes-
sional or business contacts" free from the interference of a racially or
sexually discriminatory environment. 45 The Act's purpose requires
that all plaintiffs who allege injuries to themselves as a result of being
deprived of a nondiscriminatory environment be able to sue in court
and have the merits of their individual claims judged at trial, not
through the concept of "standing."
42 Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 938.
43 Childress, 919 F. Supp. at 219.
44 Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939. The City argued this point explicitly in its brief to the Su-
preme Court opposing certiorari: "If females or blacks are the direct victims of the discrimination,
males and whites are the indirect beneficiaries." Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 12, Chil-
dress v. City of Richmond, ii8 S. Ct. 2322 (1998) (No. 97-1723).
Additionally, the district court held the officers' complaint to be so "spurious" that it could not
even support a retaliation claim, see Childress, 919 F. Supp. at 219, despite abundant precedent
from other circuits affirming the viability of such claims by nonminority plaintiffs. See cases
cited supra note 6. The district court did not acknowledge this line of cases, writing instead that
"the Court's research ... discloses no direct precedent for the instant case." Childress, 907 F.
Supp. at 939. Though none of the Childress opinions addresses the issue, it could be argued that
Childress does differ from cases decided in other circuits in that the Childress plaintiffs sought
both legal and equitable relief. Because the Civil Rights Act did not authorize monetary damages
for emotional distress resulting from hostile work environments until the i99i amendments, see
Winbush v. Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.8 (8th Cir. i995), none of the precedential circuit court de-
cisions (all decided prior to I99i) confront the question whether standing should be extended to
nonminority plaintiffs seeking money damages. However, neither the district court's opinion nor
Judge Luttig's concurrence draws a distinction between legal and equitable remedies, and there-
fore they appear to deny standing for both kinds of claims.
45 Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976). Courts and commentators have
noted in a variety of contexts that a cooperative, diverse environment benefits all who are a part
of it, not just those who were previously excluded. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 556 (299o) (noting the benefits of diversity in radio programming for both majority and mi-
nority listeners), overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 525 U.S. 200,
227 (1995); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (noting the benefits of student diversity in the university context); Robert Allen Sedler, Stand-
ing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 5oo--o (1972) (ar-
guing that all persons, regardless of skin color, have an interest in living in a nonracist society and
should have standing in court to enforce that interest).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ABORTION - SIXTH CIRCUIT STRIKES
DowN OrIo BAN OF POST-VIABILITY AND DILATION AND
EXTRACTION ABORTIONS. - Women's Medical Professional Corp. v.
Voinovich, 13o F.3d 187 (6th Cir. i997), cert. denied, ii8 S. Ct. 1347
(1998).
Recent attempts by state legislatures to ban partial-birth abortions
have been repeatedly challenged in federal courts.1 Almost invariably,
these constitutional cases turn on questions of statutory interpretation,
as federal courts attempt to construe state laws.2 When ruling on con-
stitutional challenges to statutes, federal courts must comply with the
Supreme Court's "cardinal principle" of statutory interpretation: courts
should attempt to find any "fairly possible" constitutional interpreta-
tion of a law, rather than hold it unconstitutional.3 This principle is
"mandated by our federalism" and requires federal courts to "pre-
sum[e] the statute constitutional."4 Recently, in Women's Medical
Professional Corp. v. Voinovich,s the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held unconstitutional an Ohio law banning dilation and extraction 6 ("D
& XI) abortions and all abortions after fetal viability In so doing, the
Sixth Circuit turned the Supreme Court's "cardinal principle" on its
head: at each perceived ambiguity, instead of seeking a constitutional
interpretation, the court employed precisely the interpretive stance and
reading that would invalidate the ban.
In 1995, Women's Medical Professional Corporation, an Ohio abor-
tion clinic, brought a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Ohio's
House Bill i35 ("the Act). 8 The Act imposed civil and criminal penal-
ties on doctors who performed D & X abortions, which it defined as
"the termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suc-
I See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, i44 F.3d 326 (4 th Cir. 998); Carhart
v. Steinberg, ii F. Supp. 2d o99 (D. Neb. 1998); Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033
(W.D. Wis. 1998); Summit Med. Assoc. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. i998); Evans v.
Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
2 See, e.g., Carhart, ix F. Supp. 2d at iix8 (discussing possible confusion over terms such as
"substantial portion" and "living unborn child"); Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (discussing confu-
sion over the term "partially vaginally delivers"); Summit, 984 F. Supp. at 2464 (certifying to the
Alabama Supreme Court questions about the precise definition of"partial-birth abortion"); Evans,
977 F. Supp. at 13o6-07 (wrestling with the interpretation of"complete delivery of the fetus").
3 Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 5o8 U.S. 602, 629 (1993).
4 Richmond Med. Ctr, 144 F.3 d at 332.
s 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, iiS S. Ct. 1347 (x998).
6 Dilation and extraction is an abortion technique typically used after the twentieth week of
pregnancy. In this procedure, the fetus is almost entirely delivered, so that only the head remains
in the womb. With the body outside the womb, the doctor inserts a tube into the fetal skull, suc-
tioning its contents, removing the brain, and killing the fetus. This procedure is also known as
"partial-birth" abortion. See id. at 198--99 & n.9; see also Richmond Med. Cir., 144 F.3d at 327
(describing D & X abortion).
7 See Voinovich, 13o F.3d at i9o.
8 See id. at I91-92.
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tion device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain."9 The Act al-
lowed doctors to invoke the affirmative defense that D & X was the
safest available means of abortion in a particular case,1 0 and exempted
suction curettage abortions. I' The Act also banned all post-viability
abortions except to prevent death or "substantial and irreversible im-
pairment of a major bodily function" of the mother, and required vi-
ability testing for all nonemergency abortions after twenty-two weeks
of pregnancy.12 The district court granted an injunction, holding the
ban on D & X abortions unconstitutionally vague and the ban on post-
viability abortions both unconstitutionally vague and insufficient in its
protection of the mother's mental health.
13
A divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, "but through somewhat different reasoning."1 4  Writing for
the court, Judge Kennedy First addressed the proper standard for re-
viewing facial challenges to abortion regulations.' 5  The court ac-
knowledged that outside the First Amendment context facial chal-
lenges are generally governed by the rule of United States v. Salerno,16
under which facial challenges succeed only when "no set of circum-
stances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."'1 7  However,
the court concluded that in the abortion context the Salerno test had
been silently supplanted by the "undue burden" standard of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,18 under which a law unconstitutional in a "sub-
stantial percentage" of its applications falls to a facial challenge.19
Judge Kennedy proceeded to evaluate the D & X ban under the
Casey standard. Judge Kennedy found the D & X ban unconstitu-
tional because the statutory definition of the D & X procedure also en-
9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
10 See id. § 29 19 .i5(C)I.
11 See id. § 2919.I5(A). Suction curettage abortions entail dilation of the cervix followed by
the suctioning of the entire fetus with a vacuum apparatus known as a suction curette. See Voi-
novich, 13o F. 3d at 198.
12 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17-2919.18.
13 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp io5i, 1O67, 1077 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
14 Voinovich, i3o F.3 d at 198.
15 See id. at 193-97.
16 See id. at 193-94 (discussing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
17 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
18 See Voinovich, I3O F.3d at 194--97 (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5os U.S. 833
(1992)).
19 Id. at 194 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). Several circuits have interpreted the Casey plu-
rality's opinion as implicitly overruling Salerno in the abortion context. See, e.g., Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 102 F3d 1112, i116 (ioth Cir. 1996) (holding that Casey governs facial challenges to
abortion laws, despite Salerno); A Woman's Choice - East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904
F. Supp. 1434, 1447-48 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("Like the Third and Eighth Circuits, this court believes
that Casey effectively displaced Salerno's application to abortion laws."). But see Barnes v.
Moore, 97o F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e do not interpret Casey as having overruled, sub




compassed the constitutionally protected dilation and evacuation ("D &
E) procedure.20 In some D & E abortions, the fetus's torso and head
are too well-developed to allow the doctor to remove the entire fetus
with a suction curette2' alone. In this subset of D & E abortions,
"[p]hysicians have developed different methods of removing the
head. '22 In one of these "different methods," "some physicians" com-
press the skull by suctioning out the fetus's brain.
23
Relying on this subset of D & E abortions, Judge Kennedy deter-
mined that "the Act's definition of the D & X procedure encompasse[d]
the D & E procedure, because the D & E procedure can also entail
suctioning the skull contents of the fetus. '24  The court rejected the
State's assertion that suctioning the brain at the end of such D & E
abortions does not "terminate" the pregnancy as prohibited by the Act,
because the fetus has already been "substantially dismembered. '25 The
court interpreted the Act's reference to "termination of a human preg-
nancy" to mean the completion of the abortion, and thus held that the
Act bans the subset of D & E abortions in which the brain is suc-
tioned, even though the fetus is already dead.
26
In addition, the court found that the D & E abortion procedure
was not exempted by the Act's suction curettage exception. 27  The
court found that suction curettage was only "a step in [the] process"
and that the exception did not cover the D & E procedure.28  The
court concluded that the Act "bans the use of both the D & E and D &
X procedures"29 and thus presents an unconstitutional "undue burden"
under Casey.30 Furthermore, Judge Kennedy ruled that the ban on
post-viability abortions was unconstitutional in that the Act's excep-
tion for medical emergencies was vague (because it lacked a sufficient
scienter requirement) and because it inadequately protected the
mother's mental health 3'
20 See Voinovich, 13o F.3d at 201.
21 A curette is "a spoon-shaped instrument for removing material from the wall of a cavity or
other surface." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 406 (1988).
22 Voinovich, 130 F.3d at i98.
23 Id.
24 Id. at I99.
25 Id. (quoting Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 32).
26 Id. The court explained that "'[p]regnancy' describes the woman's condition, which we do
not believe is terminated until the abortion has been completed." Id.
27 See id. at 200.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 201.
31 See id. at 203-I1. Although recognizing that the state may, under Casey, proscribe post-
viability abortions except where deemed necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother, the court found vague the requirement that physicians determine the necessity for an
abortion "in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment." Id. at 204 (quoting
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.i6(F) (Banks-Baldwin I998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court concluded that the phrase imposed both subjective and objective requirements, and
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Judge Boggs dissented, noting that federal courts "are to interpret
statutes so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions where possi-
ble."'32 Judge Boggs observed that the majority had "strain[ed] to in-
terpret" the Act "so as to make the burden ... appear 'undue.' 3 3 In
response to the claim that the D & X ban includes some constitution-
ally protected D & E abortions, Judge Boggs stated that hearing testi-
mony proved that "doctors who perform abortions have no difficulty
discerning the conduct prohibited by the statute. '34 Judge Boggs also
found that the statute's ban on post-viability abortions was not
vague35 and that severe mental harm would come within the Act's
medical necessity exception. 36
Judge Boggs was correct when he charged the majority with
straining to find that the Act imposed an undue burden, particularly
with respect to the D & X ban. Directly contradicting Supreme Court
precedent,37 the Voinovich court failed to seek a constitutional inter-
pretation of the D & X ban. Rather than adopting a consistent
method of statutory interpretation, the court repeatedly changed its in-
terpretive position in order to push the law toward unconstitutionality.
Judge Kennedy's interpretation of the D & X ban was initially very
broad. Although the legislature,38 the attorney general, and the gover-
nor all insisted that the statute covered only D & X abortions (and not
D & E abortions), and although the statute specifically mentioned D &
X as the banned procedure, 39 Judge Kennedy held that the statute was
broad enough to encompass some portions of some D & E abortions. 40
This expansive reading rests on the court's interpretation of the phrase
"termination of a human pregnancy" to refer to a completed abortion
relied on Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 0979), in which the Supreme Court ruled a statute
unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear whether the statute imposed a purely subjective
standard or a mixed subjective and objective standard. See Voinovich, 13o F.3d at 204 (citing
Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391). Furthermore, the court rejected the state's assertion that the provi-
sion's initial phrase, "[n]o person shall purposely," imparts a scienter requirement to the medical
necessity exceptions. Id. at 2o6 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A)). The court con-
cluded that this scienter requirement applied only to the performance of an abortion and not to
the determination of medical necessity. See id. Finally, although it stated that it "need not con-
sider" the constitutionality of the Act's lack of a mental health exception, id., the court concluded
that this absence was also unconstitutional, as it failed to protect the mother, see id. at 209.
32 Id. at 2 12 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
33 Id.
34 id. at 2 15.
35 See id. at 2 15-6.
36 See id. at 215-i9.
37 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 629
(1993) (stating that courts should "first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided" and that "a construction that would render a
statute unconstitutional should be avoided").
38 See Brief Amicus Curiae On Behalf of a Majority of the Members of the Ohio General As-
sembly in Support of Defendant-Appellants, Voinovich, 13o F3d 187 (Nos. 96-3157, 96-31591.
39 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
40 See Voinovich, 13o F.3d at 200.
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and not to the death of the fetus.41 Judge Kennedy's interpretation,
however, renders the statute meaningless. If pregnancy is terminated
only when the fetus is removed, no pregnancy could ever be termi-
nated by suctioning the brain of the fetus. The dead fetus would still
have to be removed in order to "terminat[e]" the pregnancy. The
court's interpretation would thus render the law inapplicable in all
cases, depriving it of all meaning.
42
While the court read the ban itself very broadly, it read the suction
curettage exception very narrowly, excluding the D & E procedure
from the protective exception. 43 The Act exempts from the ban "the
suction curettage procedure of abortion,"44 and the court's own defini-
tion of the D & E procedure mentions suction curettage four times.
45
Nevertheless, the court ruled that because physicians understand suc-
tion curettage and D & E to be distinct methods of abortion, the suc-
tion curettage exception cannot protect the D & E procedure.46 The
court thus used inconsistent interpretive methods to find the D & X
ban unconstitutional, contradicting the Supreme Court's "cardinal
principle" of statutory interpretation: that courts should construe stat-
utes to be constitutional when possible.
47
Not surprisingly, the court's underlying reasoning in employing
these competing modes of interpretation was fraught with contradic-
tion. When deciding that the ban itself covers some D & E abortions,
the court looked to the statutory definition of the D & X procedure
(though disregarding its explicit identification of D & X abortions as
the banned procedure), even though "doctors who perform abortions
have no difficulty"48 distinguishing between the two procedures. Yet
when ruling that the suction curettage exception cannot protect the D
& E procedure, the court rested its decision on doctors' understanding
41 Id. at i99.
42 In rejecting this distinction between the D & E and D & X procedures, the court correctly
noted that in some D & X procedures, like D & E procedures, the fetus is dead before the suc-
tioning. The court failed to recognize, however, that if some D & X abortions are not covered by
the statute, a constitutional interpretation would simply state that the law does not apply to those
D & X abortions. The court ignored this chance to narrow the scope of the ban. See id.
43 See id. at 200.
44 Id.
45 See id. at i98. The court described the D & E procedure as follows:
[A] suction curette ... is placed through the cervix and into the uterus. With the suction
curette, the physician can remove some or all of the fetal tissue. However, the torso and
the head of the fetus often cannot be removed using the suction curette. Therefore, the D
& E procedure typically entails dismembering the fetus, beginning with the extremities, by
means of suction curettage and forceps.
Id. (emphasis added).
46 See id. at 200.
47 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 629
(x993). In fact, a court truly faithful to its duty to adopt a constitutional interpretation would
read the ban itself narrowly and the exception broadly, so as to limit the law and avoid constitu-
tional questions.
48 Voinovich, 23o F.3d at 215 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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that suction curettage and D & E are "two different abortion proce-
dures. '49 Similarly, the court concluded that the D & X ban covers D
& E abortions because some D & E abortions include suctioning the
brain; yet it also concluded, inconsistently, that the suction curettage
exception does not cover ) & E abortions, even though all D & E
abortions include suction curettage. Just as with broad and narrow
readings, the court looked to medical understanding and characterized
an entire procedure by its component parts only when these actions
pushed the statute toward unconstitutionality. When the same tactics
would have saved the statute, they were discarded.
Finally, the court applied the "undue burden" test to the wrong
ban. Even if we accept the court's alternately broad and narrow in-
terpretations of the Act, the only D & E abortions the Act could ban
would be that subset in which "some physicians"50 have chosen to suc-
tion the brain. After all, the Act's definition of the banned procedure
to include abortions that involve suctioning the brain was the very ba-
sis of the court's conclusion that the law could cover some D & E
abortions.51 Remarkably, however, when the court applied the "undue
burden" test, it abandoned its previously close attention to the defini-
tion and instead analyzed the statute as if it banned all D & E abor-
tions. The court found that "[t]he undue burden ... lies in the fact
that the Act bans the most common second trimester procedure,"
namely, D & E.5 2 Once again, the court shifted techniques, adhering
to or ignoring the definition as it suited the court's purpose.
The Sixth Circuit crafted an opinion unconstrained by the Supreme
Court's "cardinal principle" or any other standard of statutory inter-
pretation. Rather, the opinion's only consistent interpretive principle
is that standards of interpretation are selectively and temporarily em-
ployed and rejected to flout the Supreme Court's mandate and find the
statute unconstitutional.
49 Voinovich, 13o F.3d at 201. Interestingly, although the court defers to medical understand-
ings of some terms, it did not seek a medical definition of the crucial phrase "terminate a preg-
nancy." Many medical dictionaries define pregnancy in terms of a living and developing creature
in the womb, which would contradict the court's contention that pregnancy continues even after
the fetus is dead. See, e.g., DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 4o6 (1988) (defin-
ing "pregnancy" as "the process of growth and development within a woman's reproductive or-
gans of a new individual"); THE MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1347 (Walter D. Glanze ed.,
1992) (defining pregnancy as "the condition of having a developing embryo or fetus in the body').
50 Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198.
51 See id. at 198-99.
52 Id. at 201.
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE - SCHOOL VOUCHERS - WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE
PROGRAM. - Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert.
denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-376).
The constitutionality of school voucher programs remains hotly
disputed,' even as the programs garner increasing popular support.2
Last June, in Jackson v. Benson,3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
(MPCP), one of the few publicly funded school voucher programs in
the nation to allow participation by religious schools. Finding that the
MPCP aids schools neutrally and indirectly, the court held that the
program does not violate the Establishment Clause,4 even though re-
ligious schools are likely to receive the bulk of program funds.5 Al-
though the court correctly identified neutrality and indirection as sali-
ent principles in recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases,
the court's extension of these principles to school voucher programs
was premature and in direct conflict with precedent. Moreover, the
court ignored important ways in which the MPCP endorses religion
and risks excessive entanglement between church and state.
In 1989, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the MPCP, enabling low-
income children to attend private school at no cost.6 The program be-
gan as a pilot project: only 1.5% of Milwaukee public school students
could participate, and they could choose to attend only nonsectarian
schools. 7 In 1995, however, the legislature expanded the program ten-
fold and simultaneously opened the program to sectarian schools.8 As
of the 1995-1996 school year, sectarian schools numbered 89 of the 122
private schools eligible to participate,9 and stood to receive well over
$40 million in public funds. 10
Before the amended program took effect, the plaintiffs brought
suit, alleging that the program violated the Establishment Clause and
other state and federal constitutional provisions.1 The State respon-
I See, e.g., Alan J. Borsuk, School Choice Case Highlights Fierce Debate over Religion, Pub-
lic Life, MILwAuKEE J. SENTINEL, July 5, 1998, at i.
2 See, e.g., James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TImES,
Dec. 27, 1997, at Ai.
3 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-376).
4 See id. at 620.
5 See id. at 619 n.17.
6 See id. at 607-08, 612.
7 See id. at 607.
8 See id. at 6o8.
9 See id. at 619 n.17.
10 See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.d 407,421 (Wis. CL App. i997).
11 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609. The ACLU (on behalf of Warner Jackson) and the Mil-
waukee Teachers Association first brought suit in two separate actions, both challenging the
MPCP under the Establishment Clause and the Wisconsin Constitution. The NAACP soon filed
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ded by petitioning the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a declaratory
judgment that the amended MPCP was constitutional. 12  The court
accepted jurisdiction, but split three to three; consequently, it dis-
missed the petition, effectively remanding the case to the trial court.' 3
The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding
that the amended MPCP violated the Wisconsin Constitution. 14  The
court of appeals affirmed.' 5 Because both courts held that the MPCP
violated the state constitution, neither ruled on whether the program
violated the Establishment Clause.' 6
In a 4-2 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed; reaching
the Establishment Clause question, the court upheld the amended
MPCP as constitutional. 17 Writing for the court, Justice Steinmetz
evaluated the MPCP under the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,'8 according
to which a statute survives constitutional scrutiny only if, first, it has a
secular purpose; second, it has a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and third, it does not foster an "excessive gov-
ernment entanglement" with religion.' 9
Quickly dispatching the first 2° and third2' prongs of the Lemon
test, the court focused on the second, "primary effect" prong. The
court began by emphasizing that the primary effect prong does not ab-
solutely bar state funds from wending their way to religious institu-
tions.2 2  Looking to prior Supreme Court decisions on challenges to
educational aid programs, the court argued that these precedents, al-
though not entirely consistent, "establish an underlying theory based
suit also, echoing the claims of the first two suits and adding a claim that the MPCP violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The trial court consolidated the three cases. See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.; State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996) (per curiam).
14 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 6o9-1o.
15 See Jackson, 57o N.W.2d at 411.
16 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 6Io. However, the appeals court did "consult" Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in applying the religious benefits and compelled support clauses of the Wis-
consin Constitution. The court found that a "primary effect" of the MPCP is the use of state
funds for the benefit of religious schools, and that, under Committee for Public Education v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), this effect is unconstitutional. Jackson, 57o N.W.2d at 42o-2I.
17 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 62o. The court also held that the MPCP violated neither the
Wisconsin Constitution, see id. at 62o-3o, nor the Equal Protection Clause, see id. at 630-32. Jus-
tice Bablitch wrote a two-sentence dissent, which Justice Abrahamson joined, merely noting
agreement with the appellate court's decision.
is 403 U.S. 602 (197).
19 Id. at 612-13; see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612.
20 The court found the secular purpose of the MPCP to be "virtually conceded.... [It] is to
provide low-income parents with an opportunity to have their children educated outside of the
embattled Milwaukee Public School system." Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612.
21 Finding that sectarian schools participating in the MPCP are required to meet only general,
minimal state regulations, see id. at 619, and that the state is not authorized to monitor "the
schools' governance, curriculum, or day-to-day affairs," id. at 620, the court concluded that the
MPCP did not excessively entangle church and state, see id.
22 See id. at 613.
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on neutrality and indirection: state programs that are wholly neutral in
offering educational assistance directly to citizens ... do not have the
primary effect of advancing religion." 23
The court then applied this theory to the MPCP. First, finding that
sectarian and nonsectarian schools are equally eligible to participate in
the program and that parents are in no way limited to choosing the
former, the court concluded that the MPCP takes a neutral stance to-
ward religion.2 4  Second, finding that MPG? funds reach religious
schools only through the "genuinely independent and private choices"
of individual parents, the court concluded that the MPCP benefits re-
ligious schools only indirectly;25 as a result, no reasonable observer
would infer that the program endorses religion.26  In drawing these
conclusions, the court dismissed the respondents' argument that most
program aid would likely flow to sectarian schools, finding such con-
siderations "irrelevant to our inquiry. '2
7
The Jackson court erred by not following clear Supreme Court
precedent that should have led it to strike down the MPCP. Moreover,
the court overlooked important ways in which the MPCP violates core
concerns of the Establishment Clause.
The Jackson court should have followed Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist. 28 In Nyquist, the Supreme Court struck down a
New York program providing tuition grants to low-income private
school students.2 9  Although the program distributed grants without
regard to whether the recipients attended sectarian or nonsectarian
schools, the Court did not view the program as neutral. Citing evi-
dence that nearly 85% of the state's private schools were sectarian, 30
the Court found that "the effect of the aid [was] unmistakably to pro-
vide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."31
Given that any unrestricted aid directed exclusively to private schools
would in most cases have this effect, the Court held that state funds
could be made available to sectarian schools only through a general
aid program benefiting public and private schools alike.
32
The Jackson court conceded that the Nyquist program "closely par-
allels the MPCP," but insisted that "significant distinctions" separate
23 Id.
24 See id. at 617-18.
25 Id. at 6x8 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(x986)).
26 See id. (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
27 Id. at 619 n.I7 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983)).
28 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
29 See id. at 780.
30 See id. at 768.
31 Id. at 783. The Court acknowledged that the program aided religious schools only through
the choices of parents, but found the indirect nature of the benefits "only one among many factors
to be considered." Id. at 781.
32 See id. at 782 n.38, 783.
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the two. 33 The court argued that that the Nyquist program exclusively
aided private schools and their students, whereas the MPCP gives all
qualifying students the "neutral benefit" of being able to choose to at-
tend either private or public school.
3 4
But the court's distinction cannot withstand scrutiny. Plainly, the
MPCP exclusively aids private schools: every program dollar ends up
in private schools' coffers. Although the MPCP does in a sense benefit
low-income public school students by giving them the choice of at-
tending private school, the same was true in Nyquist, where the tuition
grants were an "attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to
choose between public and nonpublic education. '35  Yet the Nyquist
Court specifically rejected the argument that the grants provided a
neutral benefit to all students regardless of whether they chose to at-
tend private school or not.36 Such an argument "proves too much," the
Court opined, for it would justify subsidizing religious schools com-
pletely, as if such aid would be neutral taken together with state
funding of the public schools - "a result wholly at variance with the
Establishment Clause."37
In support of its contrary insistence that the MPCP is neutral
"viewed in its surrounding context, '38 the Jackson court misguidedly
appealed to Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind.39 In Witters, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
vocational aid program advanced religion merely because a single re-
cipient used his aid for religious studies; what was important, the
Court reasoned, was the effect of the program "as a whole. '40  But in
contrast to the program in Witters, the MPCP "as a whole" stands to
benefit religious schools primarily. Although the MPCP does exist
alongside numerous other Wisconsin programs aiding the public
schools, this "surrounding context" does not make the MPCP itself
neutral. A program that primarily advances religion is not made neu-
tral simply by being surrounded by programs that do not.
4 1
Since Nyquist, the Court has tended to uphold neutral and indirect
educational aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges.
But the Court has never upheld a program when it has been clearly
33 Jackson, 578 N.V.2d at 614 n.9.
34 Id.; see also id. at 617-18 & n.i6.
35 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
36 See id. at 782 n.38.
37 Id.
38 Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 614 n.9.
39 See id. at 617-18 & n.9 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986)).
40 Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; see also id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Cf Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APEo8-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. May
i, 1997) ("[We question the validity of the state's premise: that two separate and distinct govern-
mental benefits, one flowing primarily to sectarian institutions and one flowing primarily to
secular institutions[,] can, in the aggregate, be neutral for Establishment Clause purposes.").
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foreseeable that it would substantially aid religious schools. 42 Nyquist
remains good law, and the Jackson court should have applied it.43
Even putting Nyquist aside, the Jackson court should still have
held that the MPCP violates core prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause: that the government neither endorse nor become excessively
entangled with religion. The MPCP endorses religion by using perva-
sively sectarian institutions" as an arm of state education policy. By
specifically amending the MPCP to include religious schools, the Wis-
consin legislature presumably intended that many students would
choose to attend them.45  Indeed, providing students this option was
part of the state's plan to improve education through competition.
Thus, the flow of MPCP funds to religious schools was not the sort of
unplanned side effect at issue in Witters and similar cases. Although
its purpose may have been simply to improve education, the legislature
clearly sought to employ religious schools to accomplish this purpose.
46
By using "essentially religious means to serve governmental ends,
42 In every major case cited by the Jackson court upholding a program against Establishment
Clause challenge, see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 614-17, the aid received by religious schools was
found insubstantial. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct 1997, 2013 ('997) ("No [public] funds ever
reach the coffers of religious schools."); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
843-44 (1995) (describing aid as "incidental"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. i,
10 (i993) (same as Agostini); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 'M"Importantly, nothing... indicates that
... any significant portion of the aid... will end up flowing to religious education."); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (describing aid as "attenuated").
43 See Agostini, 1i7 S. CL at 2017 ("We reaffirm that if a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the preroga-
tive of overruling its own decisions." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44 The Court has termed an institution "pervasively sectarian" when its secular functions are
inextricably intertwined with its religious functions, so that any state aid directed to the institu-
tion inevitably serves religious as well as secular ends. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971). Religious elementary and secondary schools are
virtually presumed to be pervasively sectarian. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384
(1985). Moreover, the Jackson record makes clear that many religious schools participating in the
MPCP are pervasively sectarian in fact. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Wis. Ct
App. 1997).
45 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that, in
racial discrimination cases, the line between a legislature's purpose and the effect of its action is
often blurred, "[flor normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds").
46 Cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 6o8-ii (1988). Although the Bowen Court held that,
in general, religious institutions may participate in publicly sponsored social welfare programs,
the Court limited its holding to cases in which no significant portion of program funds would be
disbursed to "pervasively sectarian" institutions. Id. at 61o. Contrary to the Jackson court's dec-
laration that such concerns are "irrelevant," see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619 n.17, the Court noted
that "a relevant factor in deciding whether a particular statute [impermissibly advances religion]
is the determination of whether, and to what extent, the statute directs government aid to perva-
sively sectarian institutions," Bowen, 487 U.S. at 6io. Indeed, the Bowen Court specifically re-
marked that "[tihis is not a case ... where the challenged aid [will flow] almost entirely to paro-
chial schools." Id. at 6Io-ii.
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where secular means would suffice, '47 the MPCP creates a "symbolic
union of church and state ... [that] threatens to convey a message of
state support for religion to students and to the general public."418
Moreover, the MPCP threatens impermissibly to entangle church
and state by making religious schools dependent on government
funding. The MPCP already stands to provide tens of millions of dol-
lars to religious schools; as the program continues to grow, the funds at
stake are sure to increase. Once religious schools depend on such
funds to cover tuition costs, they are made subject to the governmental
carrot and stick, and their religious freedom may thereby be compro-
mised. Although the Jackson court accurately noted that Wisconsin
currently imposes few eligibility requirements on MPCP schools, po-
litical circumstances can quickly change, and nothing would prevent
the state in the future from conditioning eligibility on acceptance of
controversial policies - for example, a requirement that birth control
be taught in health courses, or that creationism not be taught in biol-
ogy courses. 49  Precisely to avoid such conflicts, the Supreme Court
has upheld "the cardinal principle that the State may not in effect be-
come the prime supporter of the religious school system. '50  Yet the
MPCP could easily have just. this effect.
In sum, the Jackson court should have struck down the MPCP. By
upholding it, the court not only ignored precedent, but also failed to
heed the dangers the Establishment Clause aims to suppress.
47 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing the kinds of
government involvement with religion that "the Framers meant to foreclose'. One might argue
that, in this case, secular means would not suffice for the state's purposes: without the participa-
tion of religious schools, the number of private schools remaining eligible to participate in the
MPCP might fail to generate meaningful competition. However, this is merely a problem of
short-run supply that Wisconsin could address in other ways, for example, by providing seed
money for the creation of new secular private schools or the expansion of existing ones. See Jona-
than B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the
"Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 129-30
(995) (considering ways to create school competition in the short run).
48 Ball, 473 U.S. at 398; see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 64o-41, 651-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
One might argue that presumably the legislature did not open the MPCP to religious schools be-
cause they are religious; it valued the educational, not the religious, function the schools serve.
Therefore, one might conclude that the legislature should not be viewed as having endorsed re-
ligion. Cf. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618. But given the schools' pervasively sectarian nature, their
educational function cannot be separated from their religious function. It is as if the state were to
fund church services while intending merely to promote good morals: it cannot consistently en-
dorse the end while disavowing the means.
49 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 640 n.io (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("A government program that
provides funds for religious organizations to carry out secular tasks inevitably risks promoting the
pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious
mission without wholly abandoning it." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971) ("The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates
that such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of control and
surveillance. The government cash grants before us now provide no basis for predicting that
comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls will not follow.").
50 Ball, 473 U.S. at 397 (1985) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25).
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